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
 
 
Philosophical Autobiography.  I fell in love with philosophy very early. A 
decisive event and great gift in my life was that the great philosopher Dietrich von 
Hildebrand, one of the most outspoken intellectual enemies of Nazi ideology,
1
 
was a close friend of my parents and visited our house regularly from 1948 on, 
when he first returned to Europe. I was then only three years old. 
2
 After having 
had to flee Germany in 1933 and Austria in 1938, when the Nazis invaded Austria 
and sent immediately their death squad to his apartment in Vienna, from where he 
had fought Nazi ideology in Austria 1933-1938, in order to murder him, he 
emigrated first to Switzerland, then to France, and finally to the US (New York). 
Due to his unique, kind, brilliant mind, and radiant, loving and joyful personality, 
I discovered his unique lovability and loved him deeply already as a child. At 
twelve years of age, when passing through a kind of philosophical and religious 
crisis due to my contact with young relativists, materialists, and atheists, 
Hildebrand’s philosophical lectures and discussions with young people and adults 
in our home provided me with a strong antidote against these errors. At the same 
age, I read Hildebrand’s most difficult book Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft, and he 
assured me in our conversations that I had understood it very well. 
Although Hildebrand, and his indefatigable quest for philosophical truth, 
exerted an enormous impact on awakening my philosophical thinking, it was not 
he alone who stirred my interest in philosophy. I remember at nine years of age 
spending whole nights being tormented by the seeming incompatibility between 
my free will and divine foreknowledge; I almost despaired over not finding some 
ultimate philosophical answer to this profound puzzle that involves such deep 
                                                             

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1See Dietrich von Hildebrand, My Battle against Hitler. Transl. by John Henry Crosby with 
John F. Crosby, (New York: Image, 2014). 
2See Alice von Hildebrand, The Soul of a Lion: Dietrich von Hildebrand, a Biography (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000). 
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questions as those about the nature of time, eternity, God, and free will.
3
 Between 
age 12 and 14, I was fascinated and deeply moved by Plato’s works, especially the 
Apology of Socrates (of which I did dramatic public readings with friends), Crito, 
Phaedo, and Gorgias. I would say that my love and admiration for Plato clearly 
outweighs my great admiration for Aristotle - both regarding Plato’s epistemology, 
his philosophy of the soul and its immortality,
 
and his ethics. I also was, and 
always remained, profoundly impressed by Kant’s genius manifested in his 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, and fascinated by his distinction 
between synthetic and analytic propositions a priori, by his formulation of the fate 
of metaphysics depending on knowing synthetic a priori propositions and by 
some of his great ethical insights. At the same time, his Copernican turn and 
subjectivist interpretation of synthetic a priori propositions filled me with a deep 
shock. I felt that this view shook the very foundation of everything I valued and of 
objective truth. I read at the same time Hildebrand’s Der Sinn philosophischen 
Fragens und Erkennens,
4
 a book which defends a realist phenomenology and 
elaborates the “necessary essences” that cannot be explained as mere subjective 
categories or as constructs (such as Kant’s “transcendental ideas” of God, soul, 
and world). These essences are intrinsically and absolutely necessary, supremely 
intelligible, and can be known with absolute certainty. I felt called to serve a 
philosophy that offers a liberation from what I perceived at age fourteen, and still 
keep perceiving, as Kant’s destructive subjectivist Copernican turn in philosophy. 
Around that time, I also read some major works of Hildebrand’s main teacher 
Reinach that impressed me and inspired my epistemology and philosophy of law 
deeply. At age 14, I wrote my first philosophical essay on forgiveness and asking 
for forgiveness, an original and still unpublished work, inspired by Reinach’s 
discovery of the social acts (acts such as promising, thanking, or asking, that must 
                                                             
3I addressed this question much later in “To Be a Person – To Be Free,” in: Zofia J. 
Zdybicka, et al. (Ed.), Freedom in Contemporary Culture. Acts of the V World Congress of 
Christian Philosophy. Vol I (Lublin: The University Press of the Catholic University of 
Lublin, 1998), pp. 145-185; and in other works such as Where was God in Auschwitz? 
(Irving, TX/Gaflei, Liechtenstein/Santiago de Chile/Granada, Spain: The International 
Academy of Philosophy Press, Create Space, Kindle-Books, 2016). 
4Later published in English and other languages in a more definitive version: Dietrich von 
Hildebrand, Che cos’è la filosofia?/What Is Philosophy?, English-Italian (Milano: 
Bompiani Testi a fronte, 2001). 
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be perceived by their addressee in order to exist). I applied these insights to the 
acts of asking for forgiveness and forgiving (when the latter does not remain a 
mere inner act but addresses itself to its addressee, destroying, as it were, a claim 
or debt the other person has towards him who forgives). In writing this essay on 
forgiveness, I had the overwhelming experience of the joy and greatness of a 
philosophical analysis of things themselves. Hildebrand praised this first work 
very highly, and with its basic results, I still agree 57 years later. Inspired by my 
great love for beauty and especially for classical music and Renaissance art, 
another Essay on the Objectivity of the Beauty of Music was born at the same 
time, in which I drew a lot from two articles of Hildebrand on beauty.
5
 
My interest in philosophy wholly overshadowed my dedication to school 
work, such that I was punished, for example, by my math Professor in high school, 
because I read a book on Ethics during his class, which he obviously found a 
particular appalling contradiction between my actions and what I read about. My 
parents had at that time a hard time keeping me from leaving high school at age 
14 to go to New York in order to study philosophy with Dietrich von Hildebrand 
during the last years of his academic teaching activity at Fordham. At that same 
time, I also founded a private philosophical circle that met in part during joint 
vacation and in part in my parents’ home where we discussed, with friends that 
included the later philosopher Fritz Wenisch, many philosophical subjects 
including central topics of ethics, and confronted Nietzsche’s philosophical 
nihilism, of which some members of our circle were very fond. 
Diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus: (To love all truth and to love it in 
everything as goal).  From my earliest youth on, my interest in philosophy was 
directed to “things themselves,” and not centered on the opinions of various 
philosophers, however fascinating also their study was for me. But my raison 
d’être of philosophizing has always been the search for truth: in the philosophical 
and realist-phenomenological circle I founded in my youth, the doctoral program I 
directed at the University of Dallas 1973-1981, and the International Academy of 
Philosophy I founded in four different locations, always with the generous help of 
relatives, friends, and foundations. The first site of the International Academy of 
Philosophy, this school to learn “philosophize about things themselves,” was 
                                                             
5See Dietrich von Hildebrand, Die Menschheit am Scheideweg, (Regensburg: Habbel, 
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Dallas (Irving).
6
 Then it was transferred and founded anew in Liechtenstein (with 
the most generous help of Prince Nikolaus of Liechtenstein, Mr. Alphons Horten 
and many others), thereafter in Chile (with the most generous help of the PUC 
under its Rector Pedro Pablo Rosso), and now in Granada (IAP-IFES, 2011-), 
with the generous support of Don Javier Martínez, the archbishop of Granada. It 
was always inspired by this motto diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus, to love 
all truth and to love it in everything. 
Realist Phenomenology and Epistemology - Receptive Transcendence of 
Knowledge of Things in Themselves and Critique of Relativism, Skepticism, Kant 
and Later Husserl: Given my prime interest in truth, it was logical that my first 
major philosophical work, my doctoral dissertation, was entitled Knowledge of 
Objective Truth. The Transcendence of Man in Knowledge, a topic I repeatedly 
took up in later works.
7
  
In these writings, I tried to refute relativism in any of its many forms, 
                                                             
6Our first donor there was my mother who left us a large portion of a small inheritance she 
had received and Mr. Harry John, President and Founder of the De Rance Foundation, who 
was our main benefactor. Causing great harm to the IAP, Mr. John was later deprived of 
his money and influence by his wife and Vice-President Dr. Gallagher, which cost us our 
Princeton Campus directly facing Princeton University, which  we had already picked out. 
7Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit.  Die Transzendenz des Menschen in der Erkenntnis 
(Salzburg: A. Pustet, 21976). The title of the dissertation was only Die Transzendenz des 
Menschen in der Erkenntnis. In an abbreviated and revised edition: Unbezweifelbare 
Wahrheitserkenntnis. Jenseits von Skeptizismus und Diktatur des Relativismus. (Mainz: 
Patrimonium-Verlag, 2015). Back to Things in Themselves.  A Phenomenological 
Foundation for Classical Realism (London:  Routledge, 1987, 2013), Vissza a magánvaló 
dolgokhoz, (Budapest: Kairosz Kiadó, 2013). This Hungarian edition of Back to Things 
Themselves, translated and introduced by Mátyás Szalay, represents the most definitive 
and considerably enlarged edition of the work. The latest short presentation of its central 
thoughts or, as I believe, true insights, is the second chapter of my book Wahrheit und 
Person. Vom Wesen der Seinswahrheit, Erkenntniswahrheit und Urteilswahrheit.  De 
veritate – Über die Wahrheit Bd. I (Frankfurt / Paris / Ebikon / Lancaster / New Brunswick: 
Ontos-Verlag, 2009) on the truth of knowledge; and my „The Receptive Transcendence of 
Knowledge and the ‘Fourth Cogito’: Towards a Content-full Notion of ‘Early 
Phenomenology’.“ Journal of East-West-Thought (JET). Spring Number 1, Vol. 4, March 
2014, 1-26. 
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including the “transcendental relativism” present in Kant and in the late Husserl.8 
My critique addresses not only, and not even mainly, the inner contradictions of 
relativism, even though I believe that they, too, constitute a clear refutation that 
neither Russell nor Heidegger or Gadamer were able to refute in spite of their 
subtle theories. Rather, above and beyond their contradictions, relativism and 
skepticism deny what I consider the most profound epistemological datum and 
essential trait of knowledge: the receptive transcendence of knowledge that allows 
any person, including the human person, to go beyond the confines of his 
immanent conscious life and to reach the being and essence of things in 
themselves. Relativists deny this; and yet, in whatever cognitive claim relativists 
make, they presuppose this essential mark of knowledge that, when deeply 
thought through, as by Augustine, overcomes any relativism. 
I tried to show that the capacity for a receptive transcendence of human 
knowledge, reaching things themselves and things in themselves is so evidently 
given, that it is even presupposed by any attempt of Kant, Gadamer, and others to 
deny it. In order to substantiate this claim, I made many distinctions between 
different notions of “things in themselves,” making it clear that I do not defend 
the absurd or, as Gadamer puts it, diabolical claim to know the entirety of reality. 
(Obviously only an omniscient being could possess complete knowledge of things 
in themselves in the sense of the entirety of their being and the entirety of all their 
dimensions and aspects). No, I show, not by postulates or empty claims, but by 
indubitably certain rational cognitions, that in the first place with regard to 
“necessary essences” and eternal truths, which I call the first Archimedean point 
of indubitably certain knowledge, we can gain apodictically certain knowledge 
about certain necessary essences of things in themselves in all areas of being. 
There is also a second Archimedean point, accessible with equally indubitable 
knowledge to us: the real existence of my own person, and therefore of one person, 
in the “cogito”: cogito; ergo sum; ergo esse est. I think; I am; therefore being (a 
person) is. I am speaking of the phenomenological “fourth cogito” that bears 
many similarities to Augustine’s “first cogito”. Through it, we reach our own 
                                                             
8See my „Kritik am Relativismus und Immanentismus in E. Husserls Cartesianischen 
Meditationen. Die Aequivokationen im Ausdruck ‘transzendentales Ego’ an der Basis jedes 
transzendentalen Idealismus.“ Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie XIV, 1970. Der 
Widersinn des Relativismus: Befreiung von seiner Diktatur. (Mainz: Patrimonium-Verlag, 
2016). 
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being as a being that is entirely autonomous with respect our human knowledge of 
it (in this sense a “thing in itself”), even though this being is our own and we can 
only know it through our own conscious acts and within the limitations of our 
cognitive powers. The rediscovery and further phenomenological development of 
the cogito-argument that combines insights into eternal truths with the immediate 
mental perception of really existing being in its highest form, the person, was 
another tremendous experience for me of philosophizing on my own, on 
Augustine’s and on Descartes’ shoulders. Fascinated by the original Augustinian 
texts, I later developed this realist “fourth cogito” further, showing that the 
Cartesian claim that only knowing “I exist” is indubitable while all eternal truths 
could be doubted is contradictory and that both kinds of indubitable knowledge 
(of general essences and of existing being) must be fully recognized. In addition, 
that this fourth Cogito completely refutes the subjectivist and relativist 
interpretation of Husserl’s “third cogito”. 9 
The real existence of God and the necessary divine essence can likewise be 
known by human reason with indubitable certainty. I shall call this the “third 
Archimedean point” of philosophical knowledge and will explain it below. 
Philosophy of Truth and of Being: Logic and Metaphysics.  Another 
related main interest of mine lies in a philosophy of being and of truth in a very 
comprehensive sense. Such a philosophy of truth that entails metaphysics, 
epistemology, and logic, includes a philosophy of ontological truth (truth of 
                                                             
9Dietrich von Hildebrand, during guest lectures at the University of Salzburg in 1964, 
expounded this realist version of the Cartesian insights (quite contrary to Husserl’s 
Cartesian Meditations) that I called the “fourth cogito”. See Dietrich von Hildebrand, „Das 
Cogito und die Erkenntnis der realen Welt. Teilveröffentlichung der Salzburger 
Vorlesungen Hildebrands (Salzburg, Herbst 1964): ‘Wesen und Wert menschlicher 
Erkenntnis’: (7. und 8. Vorlesung), Aletheia 6/1993-1994 (1994), 2- 27. See Edmund 
Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, hrsg. u. eingel. von S. Strasser, 
in: Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke E. Husserls, auf Grund des Nachlasses veröffentlicht 
vom Husserl-Archiv (Louvain) unter der Leitung von H. L. Breda. (Den Haag, Nijhoff 
1950 – 1962), Bd. 1, 1950, and Josef Seifert, „Kritik am Relativismus und Immanentismus 
in E. Husserls Cartesianischen Meditationen. Die Aequivokationen im Ausdruck 
‘transzendentales Ego’ an der Basis jedes transzendentalen Idealismus.“ Salzburger 
Jahrbuch für Philosophie XIV, 1970, as well as Josef Seifert, Der Widersinn des 
Relativismus: Befreiung von seiner Diktatur. (Mainz: Patrimonium-Verlag, 2016).  
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being),
10
 of cognitive truth,
11
 of logical truth (the truth of judgments).
12
 Above 
and beyond this, the metaphysical status of the comprehensive truth of all 
judgments including ideal judgments no man can think of,
13
 and of the absolute 
Truth as Person, is a topic of metaphysics and philosophy of religion at once that 
interested me passionately.
14
 There is also a clear need for extensive studies into 
the nature of the truth of propositions (judgments) and critique of many false truth 
theories. Some of these identify the truth of the judgment with the object of a 
consensus. Some are reached by rational discourse (Habermas), others with 
usefulness, still others with coherence, and again others with the correspondence 
of our judgments with those of a subject who judges with evidence, etc. I try to 
show that all efforts to substitute the fundamental essence of the truth of 
propositions as the adequation between judgments and states of affairs fail.  
They fail because they are intrinsically contradictory, and they cannot liberate 
themselves from the archdatum of truth as a peculiar correspondence between 
judgment and being (state of affairs). This contradiction presupposes in each 
affirmation or negation. I show this by means of an extensive critique of many 
truth theories and forms of relativism, which reinterpret truth in terms of what it is 
not.
15
 This critique gains weight if we elaborate the positive insights hidden in 
such false and flawed theories of truth and explore the many truly existing 
                                                             
10See my Wahrheit und Person, ch. 1. 
11Ibid., ch. 2. 
12Ibid., ch. 3, and Der Streit um die Wahrheit. Wahrheit und Wahrheitstheorien. De 
Veritate – Über die Wahrheit, Bd. II/The Controversy about Truth. Truth and Truth 
Theories (Frankfurt / Paris / New Brunswick: 2009). 
13See "Is the Existence of Truth dependent upon Man?" in Review of Metaphysics (March 
1982); Wahrheit und Person, ch. 4. 
14See my Wahrheit und Person, ch. 4 and 5. In the latter, I present a detailed critique of 
Michel Henry’s book, Je suis la Vérité, in which he claims that each person IS the truth. On 
the question of the dependence of propositional truth on human acts of thinking and 
objective thoughts see my "Is the Existence of Truth dependent upon Man?" in Review of 
Metaphysics (March 1982).  
15See Josef Seifert, Der Widersinn des Relativismus: Befreiung von seiner Diktatur. 
(Mainz: Patrimonium-Verlag, 2016). (Mainz: Patrimonium-Verlag, 2016). 
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objective relations between evidence, coherence, consensus etc. and truth.
16
 
My investigations into the truth of the judgment consisting in a peculiar 
correspondence or coinciding between the judgment and the states of affairs are 
linked also to my observations at the border between logic and aesthetics of 
literary works of art. Roman Ingarden made a great discovery important for 
understanding literature and logic. He discovered in literary works of art there are 
many propositions that seem to be judgments and therefore, according to the 
principle of excluded middle, at least if they are free of ambiguities and 
equivocations, would have to be either true or false, but they are neither true nor 
false. He called them “quasi-judgments”. He found that these quasi-judgments do 
not assert states of affairs even though it belongs to them that they seem to do so 
and apparently do so. However, in fact, they are not judgments but tools to create 
the world of fiction. These peculiar creative thoughts play a crucial role in literary 
works of art. I tried to elaborate this great discovery of Ingarden,
17
 but criticized 
Ingarden for making the unjustified claim that all declarative sentences in literary 
works of art, which seem to express judgments, express solely such 
quasi-judgments that build up the fictional world but are neither true nor false. 
There are not only the “unreal judgments” of represented characters in literary 
works of art that differ from quasi-judgments. Literary works also contain many 
real judgments, which make full truth-claims. One such example is Manzoni’s 
marvelous description how secrets entrusted only to one’s best friend keep 
spreading in a single day and reach on the same evening, via many other “best 
friends,” just those persons from whom we want to guard a secret. 
                                                             
16See my Der Streit um die Wahrheit. Wahrheit und Wahrheitstheorien. De Veritate – Über 
die Wahrheit, Bd. II/The Controversy about Truth. Truth and Truth Theories (Frankfurt / 
Paris / New Brunswick: 2009). 
17See Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, transl. by George G. Grabowicz 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973); see Josef Seifert, “Ingarden’s Theory of 
the Quasi-Judgment. An exposition of Its Logical Aspects and a Critical Evaluation of Its 
Value in the Context of Understanding the Literary Work of Art,” in: Roman Ingarden. A 
filozofia noszego czasu (Cracow: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, 1995); also (with 
Barry Smith) “The Truth about Fiction,” in: Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden 
zum 100. Geburtstag, Hrsg. v. Wìodzimierz Galewicz, Elisabeth Ströker, Wìadysìaw 
Stroúewski, in: Elementa, Hrsg. Rudolph Berlinger und Wiebke Schrader  
(Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi, 1994). 
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First Principles of Ontology and Logic and Apories, Antinomies and 
Logical Paradoxes.  My philosophical interests in truth and knowledge are 
intimately linked to an interest in logic, not in the formalisms and different 
systems of logistics and symbolic logic and logical games, but rather the essence 
of logic, in its radical distinction from, and irreducibility to, psychology. I see 
these insights magnificently unfolded in Husserl´s Logical Investigations and 
Pfänder’s Logic. Building on their understanding of the objectivity and a priori 
character of logical laws, I go beyond Alexander Pfänder and Edmund Husserl in 
developing, in a more Platonic upsurge. This transcendent plenitude of ideal 
meaning units, concepts, and objective thoughts are the ultimate bearers of the 
truth of judgments and cannot be reduced to thoughts actually thought by men. 
This infinity of truth and the perfections of utmost clarity, unity, logical 
interconnections, and freedom of contradictions cannot have their ground in 
human intentional acts, as Husserl and Pfänder – in spite of their sharp critique of 
psychologist logic – believed. No, human logic can only comprehend a tiny 
fraction of the infinite realms of logical meaning units and logical laws.
18
 
Within logic in such a purely philosophical understanding, I also have a 
special interest in the relationship between general (formal) ontology and logic. 
As Pfänder has shown, the four first principles of logic that all refer to 
propositions and their truth and falsity differ sharply from the first metaphysical 
or ontological principles of the same name but depend on them. This applies to 
the principles of identity, contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason. 
On their difference and relationship, the logical laws being grounded in 
ontological ones, I have worked a great deal, in both published and even more in 
unpublished writings.
19
 Within this sphere, I am particularly fascinated with the 
problems of logical paradoxes and apparent antinomies, which I sharply 
distinguish from apories and seeming antinomies in nature. Thus, this interest is 
closely related to metaphysical problems. By investigating these, I tried to show 
that in logic itself or mathematics, when they are based on truth, no contradictions 
                                                             
18See especially my "Is the Existence of Truth dependent upon Man?" in Review of 
Metaphysics (March 1982). 
19See my Essere e persona, cit., ch. 5; “El papel de las irrealidades para los principios de 
contradicción y de razón sufficiente,” Ibáñez-Martín, J.A. (coord.), Realidad e irrealidad. 
Estudios en homenaje al Profesor Antonio Millán-Puelles, (Madrid: RIALP, 2001), pp. 
119-152. 
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can arise, which can only be due to intrinsically false and contradictory 
assumptions; and I showed that the famous paradoxes of set theory and others are 
due to equivocations and other errors. Through these examinations, I refute Kant’s 
chief argument for introducing the subjectivist transcendental turn in philosophy: 
namely, his claim of antinomies arising inevitably from the nature of things, 
which can only be solved by denying philosophical realism. On the contrary, in a 
truly realist philosophy it is impossible that contradictions and antinomies arise. 
They arise only due to false assumptions and equivocations about space, time, 
matter, and free will, not from taking them to be real. In this context, I also 
discuss the Kantian treatment of antinomies and the modern attempts of Frege, 
Russell and others to solve them.
 
Also the significance of Alexius Meinong, a 
protohenomenologist, in showing the false and contradictory assumptions that 
lead to the antinomies of set theory and others, are evaluated by me, in published 
as well as in a large unpublished book on logical paradoxes. 
20
 
Philosophy of Games and of Chess.  My hobby of playing (badly) chess 
and having been President of the Liechtenstein Chess Federation for 10 years, 
prompted me to lecture various times at the Liechtenstein Chess Open and to 
publish a book on a philosophy of chess which also represents an introduction to 
philosophy.
21
  In this work, I analyze the essence of games and the special 
reasons for the fascination with chess: the fundamentally different laws that 
govern chess: conventional ones, prudential ones, absolutely necessary 
mathematical and logical laws, and necessary laws that result from the 
combination of conventional rules and eternal truths. I also deal with the ethical 
questions regarding chess and the relation between chess and art. 
Philosophy of Law and Political Philosophy.  My two main works on 
political  philosophy, a vastly critical book on Machiavelli (which I intend to 
publish together with a defense of Machiavelli by Rocco Buttiglione, a  text he 
lost and we are looking for) and on the relations between ethics and politics, and 
                                                             
20See my Das Antinomienproblem als ein Grundproblem aller Metaphysik: Kritik der 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft in Prima Philosophia, Bd. 2, H 2, 1989; El problema de las 
antinomias considerado como un problema fundamental de toda Metafisica: Critica de la 
‘Critica de la Razón Pura,’ Revista de Filosofía 3.* epoca, vol 6 (1993); traducción de 
Rogelio Rovira, pp. 89-117; see also Überwindung des Skandals der reinen Vernunft. Die 
Widerspruchsfreiheit der Wirklichkeit – trotz Kant, (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2001). 
21 Schachphilosophie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989). 
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an analysis of Aquinas’ De Regimine Principum and on the different forms of 
government. Neither one of these have been published yet. My main published 
works in the philosophy of politics encompass the indispensable role truth and 
value, and the sinister role, ideologies play in politics. This required defining the 
nature of ideology in politics and in private life. In several articles, I liberated 
some true insights of Marx and Engels, according to which ideologies have causes 
and reasons foreign to the object of their assertions, from their huge error of 
imprisoning man entirely in ideologies that make truth claims that are not 
motivated by truth but by foreign interests. Instead of making correct and 
incorrect truth claims for motives other than their truth, the political life of man 
should and can wholly rest on truth and on the quest for truth.
22
 
In Philosophy of Law, I have dedicated many reflections to the foundation of 
basic (natural) human rights in the different levels of human dignity,
23
  as well as 
to the question as to how we know values and human rights.
24
 I also dealt with 
specific forms of human dignity and human rights in women and children 
(youths).
25
 A particular focus of my philosophy of law, however, centers on 
                                                             
22See my “Ideologie und Philosophie. Kritische Reflexionen über Marx-Engels ‘Deutsche 
Ideologie’ - Vom allgemeinen Ideologieverdacht zu unzweifelbarer Wahrheitserkenntnis“ 
in Prima Philosophia, Bd. 3, H 1, 1990. „Die Philosophie als Überwindung der Ideologie“, 
in: Al di là di occidente e oriente: Europa, a cura di Danilo Castellano 
(Napoli/Roma/Benevento/Milano: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiniane, 1994), pp. 27-50. 
23“Philosophische Grundlagen der Menschenrechte. Zur Verteidigung des Menschen“, 
Prima Philosophia V. 5 (4) (1992), pp. 339-370; “Die vierfache Quelle der 
Menschenwürde als Fundament der Menschenrechte,” in: Burkhardt Ziemske (Hrsg.), 
Staatsphilosophie und Rechtspolitik. Festschrift für Martin Kriele zum 65. Geburtstag 
(München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1997), S. 165-18. 
24“Zur Erkenntnis der Menschenrechte und ihrer axiologischen und anthropologischen 
Grundlagen”, In: (Ed.), Wie erkennt man Naturrecht? Mit Beiträgen von Rocco Buttiglione, 
Franz Bydlinski, Theo Mayer-Maly, Josef Seifert, Wolfgang Waldstein. In: Philosophy and 
Realist Phenomenology. Bd. VI (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1998), S. 
65-106. 
25“Zu den Menschenrechten und Pflichten der Jugendlichen. Philosophische Reflexionen 
über die universale Erklärung der Rechte und Pflichten der Jugendlichen,” with an English 
and an Italian summary, Medicine, Mind and Adolescence 10 (1995), 187-211, actually 
published in 1997;  
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which one is the most fundamental human right, a question that can be understood 
in three different senses and receive an answer from quite different viewpoints: 
 
1. That of the condition of the possibility of all human rights 
and goods (that I identify with the right to life). 
2. That of those rights that refer to the highest goods (which I 
interpret as the rights to the freedom of conscience and of 
religion), and: 
3. That of the most universal human right from which all others 
logically follow such as the right to be always treated as an 
end in itself.
26
 
 
Having always been fascinated with Adolf Reinach’s philosophy of the a priori in 
civil law,
 
I unfolded the distinction Reinach draws between a priori law and 
“natural law,” though I see many more parallels between them than Reinach 
admits. Moreover, while appreciating his insights into possibilities of modifying 
laws, legal obligations, and duties that follow a priori from certain acts, through 
positive law, I criticized his claims about an almost infinite possibility to change 
the a priori legal effects of fundamental acts such as promises or contracts by 
positive law.
27
 
Aesthetics and Philosophy of Beauty.  Questions of aesthetics have 
                                                             
26“Dimensionen und Quellen der Menschenwürde” in: Walter Schweidler, Herbert A. 
Neumann, Eugen Brysch (Ed.), Menschenleben – Menschenwürde. Interdisziplinäres 
Symposium zur Bioethik, Hans-Jürgen Kaatsch and Hartmut Kreß (Ed.), Ethik 
Interdisziplinär, Vol. 3, (Hamburg/München/London: LIT Verlag, 2003), pp. 51-92; 
“Menschenwürde – Fundament der Grundrechte” in: Gudrun Lang und Michael Strohmer 
(Ed.), Europa der Grundrechte? Beiträge zur Grundrechtecharta der Europäischen Union, 
edition pro munis Bd. 9 (Bonn: Culture and Science Publisher, 2002), pp. 18-38; “Is the 
Right to Life or is another Right the most Fundamental Human Right?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
- das ‘Urgrundrecht?’: Human Dignity, Moral Obligations, Natural Rights, and Positive 
Rights?” Journal of East-West Thought, Winter Nr. 4 Vol. 3, December 2013, pp. 11-31. 
27See Adolf Reinach, “The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law,” transl. by J. F. Crosby, 
Aletheia III (1983), pp. xxxiii-xxxv; 1-142; see also Josef Seifert, “Is Reinach’s 
‘Apriorische Rechtslehre’ more Important for Positive Law than Reinach Himself 
Thinks?” in Aletheia. An International Journal of Philosophy 3 (1983), pp. 197-230. 
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interested me since my earliest youth, as already mentioned in the 
autobiographical part of this essay. I dedicated special effort to elaborate two great 
aesthetical discoveries of Dietrich von Hildebrand, the higher beauty of forms, 
and a critique of aesthetic relativism. Both aesthetic investigations I published 
first in Greece,
28
 but the second one I recently expanded in my new book Der 
Widersinn des Relativismus and for the first time published it in German.
29
 
Philosophy of Nature and of Life.  In philosophy of nature, I have 
dedicated investigations to space, time (and eternity), and movement
30
 and to life. 
I seek to demonstrate life as an irreducible and ultimate datum that can in no way 
be explained, nor produced by lifeless matter. Its understanding requires a 
metaphysics of life found on all levels of being, and a phenomenology of 
biological life of plants, animals, and of men as persons-in-a-body, as well as the 
elaboration of soul as source of all life and of rational human souls that can have 
life also separated, through death, from the body.
31
 
About Different Philosophers and Philosophy in Literature. As already 
mentioned, I wrote books and articles on different philosophers, but mostly from a 
purely thematic-systematic philosophical point of view: on Plato,
32
 Aristotle,
33
 
                                                             
28“Beauty of Higher Forms (Second Potency) in Art and Nature” in Annales d’Esthetiques, 
vol. 21-22 (1982-83); “The Objectivity of Beauty in Music and a Critique of Aesthetic 
Subjectivism,” XRONIKA AISTHETIKHS Annales d’Esthéthique Tom. 31-32/1992-1993, 
33-61. 
29Josef Seifert, Der Widersinn des Relativismus: Befreiung von seiner Diktatur. (Mainz: 
Patrimonium-Verlag, 2016), ch. 6. 
30See my “Das Antinomienproblem als ein Grundproblem aller Metaphysik: Kritik der 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft“ in Prima Philosophia, Bd. 2, H 2, 1989; Essere e persona, cit. 
Ch. 10. 
31What is Life? On the Originality, Irreducibility and Value of Life. (Value Inquiry Book 
Series - VIBS), ed. by Robert Ginsberg, vol. 51/Central European Value Studies (CEVS), 
ed. by H.G. Callaway (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997). 
32See my Ritornare a Platone: la fenomenologia realista come riforma critica della 
dottrina platonica delle idee. In appendice un inedito di Adolf Reinach, ed., Preface and 
trad. by Giuseppe Girgenti, (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2000). This book is a translation and 
first publication of the first of four parts of my (largely unpublished) book on Plato. I wrote 
as well a hitherto unpublished book of defense of the Platonic Ideas against Aristotle’s 
criticisms. Besides his doctrine in the eternal forms and indubitable knowledge, and proofs 
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Anselm,
34
 Bonaventure,
35
 Duns Scotus,
36
 Kant,
37
 Nietzsche,
38
 Hegel,
39
 
                                                                                                                                           
of the soul and its immortality, the great ethical insights of Plato in the Apology, in Crito, 
and in the Gorgias enthused and deeply influenced my philosophical ethics. See my 
“Philosophizing with Plato about the Immortality of the Soul,” Philosophical News. No. 8 
marzo 2014. “Nemirtingumas” (Lithuanian: “Immortality”),  Logos 12 (1997/12), mit 
einer Einführung von Magister Aivaras Stepukonis, S. 81-109; “¿Tenemos y somos un 
alma espiritual e inmortal?” in: Carlos A. Casanova (Ed.), Carlos Casanova, Josef Seifert, 
Daniel von Wachter, El alma, la providencia y el derecho natural (un ejercicio de filosofía 
como capacidad de juzgar). Las tres conferencias de cierre de la International Academy of 
Philosophy at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de CHILE, pp. 11-40. See also my “The 
Idea of the Good as the Sum-total of Pure Perfections. A New Personalistic Reading of 
Republic VI and VII,” in Giovanni Reale and Samuel Scolnikov (Ed.), New Images of 
Plato. Dialogues on the Idea of the Good, (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2002), pp. 
407-424; “Moral Goodness Alone Is ‘Good Without Qualifications’: A Phenomenological 
Interpretation and Critical Development of some Kantian and Platonic Ethical Insights 
into Moral Facts which Contribute to the Moral Education of Humanity,” in The Paideia 
Project (20th World Congress of Philosophy in Boston August 10-15, 1998);  
“Philosophizing with Plato about the Immortality of the Soul,” Philosophical News. No. 8 
marzo 2014. Anima, 140-162; ”Salvezza e condanna come problemi filosofici: riflessione 
sul Gorgia di Platone,” Revista Teologica di Lugano III, 2 (1998), 265-289; “Platón y la 
fenomenología realista. Para una reforma critica del Platonismo,” Anales del Seminario de 
Metafísica 29 (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1995), pp. 149-170; “Alcune pagine della 
Postfazione all'edizione tedesco di questo libro di Josef Seifert” in: Giovanni Reale, Per una 
nuova interpretazione di Platone, 16th ed., Appendice VI, (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1996), 
pp. 859-870; “Nachwort des Herausgebers zu Giovanni Reale,” Zu einer neuen 
Interpretation Platons. Eine Auslegung der Metaphysik der großen Dialoge im Lichte der 
‘ungeschriebenen Lehren’ übers. v. L. Hölscher, (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1993), pp. 
541-558. 
33“A Phenomenological and Classical Metaphysics of the Person: Completion and Critique 
of Aristotle’s Metaphysics” in: Richard P. Francis and Jane E. Francis (Ed.), Christian 
Humanism. International Perspectives (New York/Washington, D.C./San 
Francisco/Bern/Frankfurt a.M./Berlin/Vienna/Paris: Peter Lang, 1995), pp. 213-22; 
“Persons and Causes: beyond Aristotle,” Journal of East-West Thought, Fall Issue Nr. 3 Vol. 
2, September 2012, pp. 1-32; 
34Large portions of my books, for example of Gott als Gottesbeweis, cit.; or Of Essere e 
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persona, cit., ch. 5, and several articles dealt with Anselm: “Der Vergessene 
Protophänomenologe Anselm: Anselm von Canterburys‚ ‘Ontologisches Argument' und die 
Methode der Realistischen Phänomenologie von Edmund Husserl bis zur Gegenwart,” The 
Paideia Project (20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston: August 10-15, 1998) 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Meth/MethSeif.htm; "Kant und Brentano gegen Anselm 
und Descartes. Reflexionen über das ontologische Argument” in Theologia (Athens 1985), 
3-30; “Kant y Brentano contra Anselmo y Descartes. Reflexiones sobre el argumento 
ontológico,” Thémata 2 (Universidades de Malaga y Sevilla, 1985): 129-147. 
35 “Bonaventuras Interpretation der augustinischen These vom notwendigen Sein der 
Wahrheit” in Franziskanische Studien, H 1 (1977), 1. Halbj., 59; “Si Deus Deus est, Deus 
est. Reflections on St. Bonaventure’s Interpretation of St. Anselm’s Ontological 
Argument” Proceedings of the PMR Conference (8) (8th Conference on Patristic, 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Villanova) (1983), pp. 119-129; 
36“Essere Persona Come Perfezione Pura. Il Beato Duns Scoto e una nuova metafisica 
personalistica,” De Homine, Dialogo di Filosofia 11 (Rom: Herder/Università Lateranense, 
1994), pp. 57-75; “A volontade como perfeição pura e a nova concepção 
não-eudemonística do amor segundo Duns Scotus,” traduzido do inglés por Roberto 
Hofmeister Pich, Veritas (Philosophische Fakultät, PUCRS, Porto Alegre, Brasilien: 
September 2005), pp. 51-84. “Duns Scotus’ Philosophie des Individuums und Kritik am 
Abstraktionismus der aristotelischen Erkenntnistheorie als grandioses Beispiel einer mit 
dem christlichen Glauben vereinbaren Philosophie,” Intus legere. Filosofía Año 2015. Vol. 
9/No 2, 111-124. 
37 Überwindung des Skandals der reinen Vernunft. Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der 
Wirklichkeit – trotz Kant, (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2001); “Grandezas Y 
insuficiencias de la filosofía kantiana de la dignidad humana. Un análisis crítico” in: 
Ignacio García de Leániz (ed.), De nobis ipsis silemos. Homenaje a Juan Miguel Palacios, 
(Madrid: Encuentro, 2010, pp. 173-204. 
38 “Friedrich Nietzsches Verzweiflung an der Wahrheit und sein Kampf gegen die 
Wahrheit” in Rehabilitierung der Philosophie (Regensburg: J. Habbel, 1974), ed. Dietrich 
von Hildebrand, pp. 301-332; “Wahrheit als Orientierungspunkt menschlicher 
Entscheidungen” in: G. Gelhaer (Ed.), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Beiträge zur 
Nietzsche-Forschung anläßlich des Jubiläumsjahres, 2. erw. Auflage (Traude Junghans 
Verlag, 1995). 
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Brentano,
40
 Husserl,
41
 Vico,
42
 Scheler,
43
 Hildebrand,
44
 and others. 
                                                                                                                                           
39“Truth and History. Noumenal Phenomenology (Phenomenological Realism) defended 
against some Claims made by Hegel, Dilthey, and the Hermeneutical School” in Diotima 
XI, Athens 1983, 160-181. 
40“Eine kritische Untersuchung der Brentanoschen Evidenztheorie der Wahrheit,“ Brentano 
Studien XII - 2006/09; 307- 356. 
41Apart from the mentioned works, “The Significance of Husserl’s Logical Investigations 
for Realist Phenomenology” and a critique of several ‘Husserlian Theses’ on 
phenomenology, In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Publication of 
Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1901/01-2001/2),” in: Instituto de Filosofía, 
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile en Santiago, Seminarios de Filosofía, Vols. 17-18, 
(Santiago de Chile: Instituto de Filosofía, 2004-2005), pp. 133-190. 
42 “L’Uomo comprende meglio le cose fatte da lui stesso che non quelle non create da lui? 
Riflessioni critiche sul principium verum factum di Giambattista Vico” (Riassunto in 
Italiano) in: Studi italo-tedeschi/Deutsch-Italienische Studien XVII, Giambattista Vico 
(1668-1744), pp. 91-93; Versteht der Mensch das von ihm selbst Gemachte besser als das 
nicht von ihm Geschaffene? Kritische Reflexionen über Giambattista Vicos 
Verum-Factum-Prinzip?” in: Studi italo-tedeschi/Deutsch-Italienische Studien XVII, 
Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), pp. 53-90. 
43“Schelers Denken des absoluten Ursprungs: Zum Verhältnis von Schelers Metaphysik 
und Religionsphilosophie zum ontologischen Gottesbeweis,” in: Christian Bermes, 
Wolfhart Henckmann, Heinz Leonardy und Türingische Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Jena 
(Hg.), Denken des Ursprungs – Ursprung des Denkens. Schelers Philosophie und ihre 
Anfänge in Jena. Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie 3 (1998), S. 34-53; “Scheler on 
Repentance” in: John F. Crosby, (Ed.), Max Scheler, American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly, 79, 1 (Winter 2005), 183-202; “Max Schelers Denken über Frieden und 
Solidarität“, in: Christian Bermes/Wolfgang Henckmann/Heinz Leonardy (Hrsg.), 
Solidarität. Person und soziale Welt, (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2006), pp. 
87-106 
44I refer to him in almost all of my writings, but wrote a number of papers about him, for 
example, ”Dietrich von Hildebrand and seine Schule” in Christliche Philosophie im 
katholischen Denken des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. E. Coreth, W.M. Neidl, G. 
Pfligersdorffer, vol 3 (1989), pp. 172-200; Wert und Wertantwort. Hildebrands Beitrag zur 
Ethik” in Prima Philosophia, Sonderheft 1, 1990; “Personalistische Philosophie und 
Widerstand gegen Hitler.” Zum Kampf Dietrich von Hildebrands gegen den 
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Philosophy of the Person: Philosophical Anthropology, Soul, Body, 
Immortality. Besides these moral, epistemological and logical questions, my 
philosophical interest and work centers also, and in a special way, on philosophy 
of man, philosophical anthropology and philosophy of the person. I dedicated 
many works to this topic, starting with my books of defense of the existence of a 
real, living, spiritual and rational human soul, and its radical distinction from the 
body. At the same time, I showed the deep unity of man as a new composite 
substance composed of body and soul can only be comprehended if the difference 
between body (brain) and mind (soul) is clearly understood.
45
 To defend this view, 
I distinguish many quite different meanings of the confusing term “dualism.” Just 
as the radical difference between a concept and the conceptual logical meaning of 
a word and the physical word does not counteract their profound union, but 
renders it possible, so the radical difference between the body/brain from the soul 
does not in any way jeopardize their unity. On the contrary, the substantial and 
radical distinction between body and soul is the condition of their unity. 
Understanding this also involves distinguishing different types of unity, only two 
of which are or presuppose identity. 
My main work on philosophy of the person (soon to be published in English 
and in Spanish) is Essere e persona,
46
 which Giovanni Reale, who “commanded 
                                                                                                                                           
Nationalsozialismus, seine Ideologie und seinen rassistischen Antisemitismus” in: Josef 
Seifert (Ed.), Dietrich von Hildebrands Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus, Reihe 
Akademie-Reden/Internationale Akademie für Philosophie im Fürstentum Liechtenstein 
(Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1998), pp. 107-163.  
45See my Leib und Seele. Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen Anthropologie (Salzburg: A. 
Pustet, 1973); Das Leib-Seele Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion.  
Eine kritisch-systematische Analyse (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
21989).; What is Life? On the Originality, Irreducibility and Value of Life. Value Inquiry 
Book Series (VIBS), ed. by Robert Ginsberg, vol 51/Central European Value Studies 
(CEVS), ed. by H.G. Callaway (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997); ”Sind Geist und Gehirn 
verschieden? Kritische Anmerkungen zu einigen Neuerscheinungen zum 
Leib-Seele-Problem,” Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 18.2 (1993), 37-60. 
46Essere e persona. Verso una fondazione fenomenologica di una metafisica classica e 
personalistica. (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1989); Fiinôá ói persoaná. Spre o fundamentare 
fenomenologicá a unei metafizici clasice ói personaliste, trad. N.I. Marió, (Bucureóti, 
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me to write it”, called my Summa. In it, I showed that being in the most proper 
sense and in the absolute sense is being-person.
47
 I offered many reasons to 
defend this thesis: 
 
a) Persons are substances in a far higher sense such that 
Aristotle’s description of being in the most proper sense as 
“substance” is quite incomplete; 
b) All essential features of the person show that it is an 
insuperable perfection of being to be person, and that the 
highest values and perfections of being can solely be 
possessed by persons. That the acts and accidents that 
Aristotle excluded from metaphysics belong there, which is 
most clearly seen through the person; that God must 
necessarily be a personal being.
48
 
 
The interest in anthropology entails also many published and unpublished works 
on the immortality of the human soul, a question which, from my reading of 
Plato’s Phaedo and my earliest philosophical works on (for example an 
unpublished dialogue Orpheus and Eurydice – On the Immortality of the soul 
written in 1964) occupied me deeply. Agreeing with Blaise Pascal and Gabriel 
Marcel, it also appeared wholly astonishing and shocking to me how little interest 
so many human beings, including philosophers, have on a question on which “our 
whole or our nothing” depends.  Distinguishing between the religious faiths, for 
example the Christian faith in resurrection and eternal life that transcends entirely 
philosophical demonstrations, and natural human reason, I develop many purely 
philosophical proofs for the immortality of the soul.
  
Some of them are more 
abstract metaphysical ones based on the simplicity and indestructibility of the soul 
proposed by Plato. Others are more deeply personalist and existential and I give 
precedence to these, arguing for the immortality of the human soul based on the 
moral life, knowledge, love, hope, gratitude, etc. rather than on the grounds of the 
soul’s mere spirituality, lack of composition of parts and indestructability of 
                                                                                                                                           
Romúnia. Editura Yes, 2004). Rumanian translation. The book will be published in 2017 
by IAP-Press, and based on this enlarged edition, in Spanish. 
47Ibid., ch. 9. 
48Ibid., 10-15. 
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simple substances. Such proofs of immortality have two major flaws: they do not 
prove a lived and experienced immortal life and could even prove an immortality 
of energy quants. They do not contribute to know a positive value content of life 
after death. They would just as much apply to heaven as to hell. Therefore, I 
prefer by far the personalist proofs for the immortality of the soul. 
Their first premise is that the meaning and vocation of the human person, his 
aspiration to the fulfillment through knowledge, love, happiness, love of God, etc. 
is inseparable from immortality.
49
 This meaning of human existence would be 
frustrated and absurdly contradicted if his life ended like that of an insect or rat. A 
metaphysical disharmony to its innermost essence would result if death were the 
destruction of personal human life. The reason to reject that reality could contain 
such an absurdity and tragic contradiction, can be found, on a first level, in the 
inner essence and inner truth of those aspects of personal life, which promise 
immortality. In virtue of their inner truth they are as it were “prophetically 
announcing” immortality with authority instead of us just being captured by 
unrealistic wishful thinking. By its nature, the soul is ordained to an immortal life. 
                                                             
49 Among other works see my Filosofie, Pravda, Nesmrtlenost. Tòi praúskå 
pòednáóky/Philosophie, Wahrheit, Unsterblichkeit. Drei Prager Vorlesungen/ Philosophy, 
Truth, Immortality. Three Prague Lectures (tschechisch-deutsch), pòeklad, úvod a 
bibliografi Martin Cajthaml, (Prague: Vydala Kòestanská akademie Òim, svacek, edice 
Studium, 1998); “Philosophizing with Plato about the Immortality of the Soul,” 
Philosophical News. No. 8 marzo 2014. Anima, 140-162; “Nemirtingumas” (Lithuanian: 
Immortality),  Logos 12 (1997/12),  mit einer Einführung von Magister Aivaras 
Stepukonis, S. 81-109; “Anima, morte e immortalità,“ in: L’Anima, Seconda Navigazione. 
Annuario di filosofia 2004, (Mailand: Mondadori, 2004), S. 157-182; “¿Poseemos y somos 
un alma inmortal?”, Philosophia, 73, 1 (2013), 13-42; “¿Tenemos y somos un alma 
espiritual e inmortal?”, in: Carlos A. Casanova (Ed.), Carlos Casanova, Josef Seifert, 
Daniel von Wachter, El alma, la providencia y el derecho natural (un ejercicio de filosofía 
como capacidad de juzgar). Las tres conferencias de cierre de la International Academy of 
Philosophy at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de CHILE, pp. 11-40; „Das 
Unsterblichkeitsproblem aus der Sicht der philosophischen Ethik und Anthropologie“, 
Franziskanische Studien, H 3 (1978); ”Unsterblichkeit,” in: Evangelisches Lexikon für 
Theologie und Gemeinde, ed.v. H. Burkhardt und U. Swarat Bd. III. (Wuppertal und 
Zürich: R. Brockhausverlag, 1994), pp. 2061-2064. A whole book on the immortality of 
the soul is still unpublished. 
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Marcel formulates “To love someone is telling him you will not die.” An even 
deeper ground of affirming philosophically and apodictically the immortality of 
the soul can be reached, if we can know the existence of God, an infinitely good 
being who cannot possibly mock human persons by making death have the last 
word. 
I try to show the fundamental differences between philosophical proofs of the 
immortality of the soul and the authoritative message of the Christian faith of the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ and our resurrection. This message answers profound 
human aspirations and questions pure philosophy is unable to answer. Philosophy, 
confronted with the ultimate mysteries of human life, gets only to the threshold. 
To go beyond requires a further leap and act of faith on our side, and a revelation 
of truths inaccessible to purely human rational efforts. When philosophy forgets 
this, it turns into violent constructions, unsupported theories and its rationalism 
ends up with a deep irrationalism. Thus, confronted with these ultimate questions 
about persons, philosophy ends up recognizing both the immense greatness and 
the abysmal misery and poverty of human reason, left solely to its own resources 
of wisdom. 
Death and “brain death”. I have dedicated a large number of writings to a 
critique of a redefinition of human death in terms of “brain death”.50 
Philosophy of God and the Third Archimedean point in the Ontological 
Argument.  In two major books and many articles, I have also shown that the 
real existence of God as well as the uninventible and necessary divine essence can 
likewise be known by human reason with indubitable certainty. I wish to call this 
the “third Archimedean point” of philosophical knowledge. I defended many ways 
                                                             
50For example (among many more): ”IS ‘Brain death’ actually death?” The Monist 76 
(1993), 175-202, or: “Brain Death and Euthanasia” in: Michael Potts, Paul A. Byrne, and 
Richard G. Nilges (Ed.), Beyond Brain Death. The Case against Brain Based Criteria for 
Human Death, (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 
201-227; “Consciousness, Mind, Brain, and Death,” in: Calixto Machado/D. Alan 
Shewmon, (Ed.), Brain Death and Disorders of Consciousness, (New 
York/Boston/Dordrecht/London/Moscow: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004), pp. 
61-78; “On ‘Brain Death’ in Brief: Philosophical Arguments against Equating It with 
Actual Death and Responses to Arguments in favor of Such an Equation” in: Roberto de 
Mattei (Ed.), Finis Vitae: Is Brain Death still Life? Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 
(Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 2006, 2007), pp. 189-210. 
AUTO-PRESENTATION OF MY PHILOSOPHY 
 
29 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
of reaching indubitable knowledge of God from the world, both classical 
cosmological arguments that I defended in a new personalist perspective, and 
specifically personalist proofs of the existence of God from the essence of 
gratitude, of moral values and of love.
 51
 However, the center and most profound 
foundation of all proofs of the existence of God is the Anselmian-Cartesian 
ontological argument, which I meticulously considered and defended against its 
many critics. I demonstrated that this proof has four fundamental philosophical 
preconditions, all of which can be known to be true, and thus allow a refutation of 
the objections Aquinas, Kant, Brentano and others have raised against it. 
1. Its starting point must not be a mere arbitrary concept or subjective idea, in 
which case it would be guilty of the many logical mistakes Aquinas, Kant, 
Brentano and others identified. Rather, it proceeds in its valid form from the 
objectively necessary and supremely intelligible (though mysterious) divine 
essence. This starting point, once recognized, makes the argument immune 
against a series of objections that would be perfectly valid as long as this first 
precondition is not established. 
2. It presupposes that we have a true and sufficient knowledge of this divine 
essence to know God’s existence from its mere contemplation. By means of 
complex epistemological analyses and distinctions between different perfections 
and imperfections of human knowledge of God, I reached the conclusion that the 
knowledge of the divine essence accessible to human reason is sufficient to 
ground the ontological proof of the existence of God. The following are the key 
steps and distinctions that serve establishing this second precondition: 
a) The divine essence and its infinite perfection is co-given to human 
knowledge in the knowledge of the world in its finitude. The latter could not be 
known without possessing some knowledge of the former, as Bonaventure and 
Descartes pointed out. 
b) The fact that we neither possess a complete, nor a perfectly deep, nor an 
immediate knowledge of God that would not be in some way mediated by the 
experience of the world, is perfectly compatible with possessing a sufficient 
knowledge of God to turn this knowledge into a valid second column of the 
ontological argument. 
                                                             
51See my Erkenntnis des Vollkommenen. Wege der Vernunft zu Gott, (Bonn: Lepanto 
Verlag, 2010); Conocimiento de Dios por las vías de la razón y del amor. (Traducido por 
Pedro Jesús Teruel, revisado y aumentado por el autor), (Madrid: Encuentro, 2013). 
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3. The ontological argument presupposes that existence is a real predicate and 
that the necessary existence of God can be known to be inseparable from the 
divine essence and is not extrinsic to it in the way it is in all contingent beings, 
inasmuch as what they are (essence) could never have existed. That existence 
(being) is a real predicate I showed by first refuting the Kantian claim that 
existence is not any predicate and adds nothing to the concept of a thing.
52
 Apart 
from contradicting Kant’s own assertion that existential propositions are always 
synthetic (which presupposes that, logically speaking, the concept of existence 
“adds something to the concept of a thing”), the evident meaning of asserting or 
denying the existence of certain things refutes Kant through the evidence of things 
themselves. It is certainly true that existence (Sein) does not as such add essential 
predicates and constitutes, ontologically speaking, quite a unique predicate. It is 
also true that in all contingent beings’ existence somehow falls outside the essence 
or is a gift that does not simply flow from their essence. Nevertheless, Kant 
falsely universalizes this truth and applies it precisely to the divine being to whom 
it evidently does not apply. He fails to see, furthermore, that, if the “extrinsic 
relation” of existence to essence, its falling in a sense “outside of essence,” would 
be the only relation existence could have to essence, and if existence never were 
bound inextricably to essence, no really existing being could have a sufficient 
reason for being, instead of not being. Thus, the evidence of the principle of 
sufficient reason would be violated in a most grievous manner.
53
 
4. The ontological argument, finally, presupposes that the infinite goodness 
and value perfection (greatness) of the divine essence entails His existence. No 
limitedly and finitely perfect being, such as the ‘lost’ island of Gaunilo, could exist 
                                                             
52A preliminary study of this metaphysical relation between essence and existence that was 
planned as first part of Gott als Gottesbeweis, cit., was my work Sein und Wesen, 
(Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996). It was preceded by my English debate 
with “existentialist Thomism” (Gilson and others): „Essence and Existence.  A New 
Foundation of Classical Metaphysics on the Basis of ‘Phenomenological Realism,’ and a 
Critical Investigation of ‘Existentialist Thomism’,“ Aletheia I (1977), pp. 17-157; I,2 
(1977), pp. 371-459. 
53On this see, besides Gott als Gottesbeweis, cit., my Sein und Wesen (Heidelberg: 
Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996), ch. 2; „Essence and Existence.  A New Foundation 
of Classical Metaphysics on the Basis of ‘Phenomenological Realism,’ and a Critical 
Investigation of ‘Existentialist Thomism’,“ Aletheia I (1977), ch. 2. 
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necessarily, but beyond that: infinite value-perfection is the very nucleus and heart 
of the divine essence. Harkening back to Plato, the name of God “id quo melius 
(maius) nihil esse sive cogitari possit” (that better than which nothing can be or 
even conceived) is not dissimilar to the Biblical assertion “God is Love”, a name of 
God more intimate than “I am He who is”. One may summarize this fourth 
precondition of the ontological argument with Augustine: “This good and that 
good: take away this and that, and look at the good itself if you can; then you will 
see God, who is not good by another Good but the quintessence and sum-total of 
the Good (literally: the good of any good).”54 
I presented, on 700 pages, detailed analyses and a phenomenological 
metaphysical defense of these four conditions under which the ontological proof of 
the existence of God is not only perfectly valid but the deepest of all of them, and 
implicitly presupposed by all others (as also Kant saw; but while he rejected it, I 
defended it).
55
 
Discours des Méthodes: Radical Rethinking of the Phenomenological 
Methods. It is clear that presenting all of these epistemological and metaphysical 
results with the claim that they can be known by a rigorous phenomenological 
return to things themselves and things in themselves (i.e., by a phenomenological 
                                                             
54Augustine , De Trinitate VIII, 3 (CCL 50 p. 273/44, Corpus Augustinianum Gissense a C. 
Mayer editum): “Bonum hoc et bonum illud: tolle hoc et illud, et vide ipsum bonum si 
potes; ita deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni.” I tried to defend the 
interpretation of Plato’s ‘Idea of the Good’ as coinciding with a living God-Creator in “The 
Idea of the Good as the Sum-total of Pure Perfections. A New Personalistic Reading of 
Republic VI and VII” in: Giovanni Reale and Samuel Scolnikov (Ed.), New Images of 
Plato. Dialogues on the Idea of the Good, (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2002), pp. 
407-424. 
55 See my Gott als Gottesbeweis. Eine phänomenologische Neubegründung des 
ontologischen Arguments, (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996), 2. Aufl. 2000; 
“Kant und Brentano gegen Anselm und Descartes. Reflexionen über das ontologische 
Argument” in Theologia (Athens 1985), 3-30; “Kant y Brentano contra Anselmo y 
Descartes. Reflexions sobre el argumento ontologico” in Thémata 2 (Universidades de 
Malaga y Sevilla, 1985); “Über das notwendige Dasein Gottes. Eine kritische Antwort auf 
Franz Brentanos Kritik des ontologischen Gottesbeweises” in: Ion Tánásescu (ed.), Franz 
Brentano’s Metaphysis and Psychology.Upon the Sesquicentennial of Franz Brentano’s 
Dissertation, (Bucharest: Zelta Books, 2012), pp. 180-224. 
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method) requires a radical rethinking of phenomenology. One must understand as 
well the phenomenological method and clarity about the limited role of epoché. 
The leading principle of this new realist phenomenology is that the only decisive 
principle of phenomenology is the return to things themselves, (i.e., moving away 
from all kinds of confusions, constructs, arbitrary and false assumptions, 
unexamined prejudices, and premature systematizations). In other words, the only 
goal is a pure seeing of things as they truly are. A phenomenological method apt to 
reach, or at least to approach, this goal, allows a rigorous scientific metaphysics, 
ethics, and realist epistemology. I explicitly dedicated to the elaboration of such a 
realist phenomenological method, besides the mentioned works, a book and several 
articles on methods of philosophy.
56
  In my book, I distinguished thee general 
meanings of methods and many subspecies of each of them: 
1. Method as type of knowledge used, which entails in philosophy immediate 
vision of necessary essences, insights into essential states of affairs, logical 
demonstrations, and others. 
2. Methods in the sense of elements of these kinds of knowledge, such as 
distinctions of a datum from similar or opposite phenomena, dialogue, dialectics 
and responses to objections. 
3. Tricks and devices to reach philosophical knowledge such as epoché, free 
variation, methodic doubt, linguistic analysis of word-meanings, or the “negative 
test” of Gabriel Marcel. 
I think that the quest for rigorous and indubitable scientific philosophical 
knowledge is no mere modern prejudice, as many traditional philosophers claim, 
but exists since Plato and Aristotle, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, 
Husserl, Hildebrand and the present, and is a perfectly legitimate and 
praiseworthy desire of human reason. This does not deny that a restriction of 
philosophical knowledge to solely indubitably certain knowledge is a dangerous 
rationalist and inhuman error.
57
 
                                                             
56 Discours des Méthodes. The Methods of Philosophy and Realist Phenomenology, 
(Frankfurt / Paris / Ebikon / Lancaster / New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2009); Discurso 
sobre los métodos. Filosofía y fenomenología realista, (Madrid: Encuentro, 2008); “Was 
ist Philosophie? Die Antwort der Realistischen Phänomenologie,” Zeitschrift für 
philosophische Forschung 49 H 1 (1995), 92-103. 
57 See my “Phänomenologie und Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. Zur Grundlegung 
einer realistischen phänomenologischen Methode – in kritischem Dialog mit Edmund 
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Ethics: Foundations and Applications – 4 Dimensions of Human Dignity: 
A further chief field of my philosophical investigations is ethics, both the 
foundation of ethics and applied ethics or concrete ethical questions. On the 
foundation of ethics, I have published two books and several articles.
58
 Some of 
my articles defend strongly our human capacity to know what is morally good and 
what is morally evil without presupposing any religious faith. In fact, if we did 
not have some rational knowledge of moral values and disvalues, faith would be 
                                                                                                                                           
Husserls Ideen über die Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft” in: Filosofie, Pravda, 
Nesmrtlenost. Tòi praúskå pòednáóky/Philosophie, Wahrheit, Unsterblichkeit. Drei Prager 
Vorlesungen/ Philosophy, Truth, Immortality. Three Prague Lectures 
(tschechisch-deutsch), pòeklad, úvod a bibliografi Martin Cajthaml, (Prague: Vydala 
Kòestanská akademie Òim, svacek, edice Studium, 1998), S. 14-50; “La filosofia come 
scienza rigorosa. La fondazione di un metodo fenomenologico realista in dialogo critico 
con le idee sulla filosofia come scienza rigorosa di Edmund Husserl,” Saggio integrativo, 
in: Dietrich von Hildebrand, Che cos’è la filosofia?/What Is Philosophy?, 
Englisch-Italienisch (Milano: Bompiani Testi a fronte, 2001), 535-568; also published in 
Russian, Czech, and Lithuanian. I also wrote an unpublished book-length manuscript on 
sense perception and knowledge of other persons (both of which include less than 
apodictically certain knowledge). 
58 Josef Seifert, Was ist und was motiviert eine sittliche Handlung? (What is and What 
Motivates a Moral Action?), (Salzburg: Universitätsverlag A. Pustet, 1976); Qué es y qué 
motiva una acción moral?, presentación de Alfonso López Qintás, tradd. de y ensayo 
introductorio de Mariano Crespo (Madrid: Centro Universitario Francisco de Vitoria, 
1995); an English edition will come out in 2017. The Philosophical Diseases of Medicine 
and Their Cure. Philosophy and Ethics of Medicine. Vol. 1: Foundations. Philosophy and 
Medicine, vol. 82 (New York: Springer, 2004) – Philosophical Diseases of Medicine and 
Their Cure. Philosophy and Ethics of Medicine. Vol. 1: Foundations. Philosophy and 
Medicine, vol. 82, Kluwer online e-book, 2005; “Natural Law: Persons Are United through 
Ends: Seven Different Relations between Persons and Ends and Their Relation to Natural 
Law and Community of Persons,” Revista Española de Teología Vol. 67, cuad. 2-3, 
Facultad de Teología “San Damaso,” 67 (2007), pp. 149-163; and several unpublished 
ones, especially a large German book of critique of the “purely teleological foundation of 
ethics.” 
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deprived of its natural presuppositions.
59
 I also wrote a number of papers in 
revealing that, underlying religious faith, there are also some rational intuitions 
into divine holiness, without which authentic religious faith would be without 
foundation.
60
 
In Was ist und was motiviert eine sittliche Handlung?, cit., I investigate only 
a small portion of the moral sphere, namely actions in the rigorous sense that aim 
at the realization of states of affairs in the world. They differ from purely inner 
acts such as gratitude as well as from general attitudes such as virtues and vices or 
fundamental moral attitudes, which are other important topics of ethics on which I 
have written later.
61
 Within moral actions in that narrow sense, I investigate again 
only a portion, namely morally obligatory actions, sparing good but not obligatory 
(supererogatory) actions for other ethical investigations. 
I propose the thesis that the kind of motive I have, or better said, should have, 
for obligatory and free moral actions to be morally good, is of the essence of the 
moral action and inseparable from the question, whether, and to which degree, an 
action is morally good and obligatory. I distinguish between indispensable 
motives for a moral action to be morally good, ideal motives, and accidental 
superadded motives, which are not indispensable for the moral value of the action, 
and in a sense, do not belong to its essence. Excluding critically the eudemonistic, 
hedonistic, utilitarian and other theories regarding the motivation of moral actions, 
                                                             
59See Josef Seifert, San Pablo y Santo Tomás sobre Fides et ratio. ¿Fue San Pablo el crítico 
más severo o, con Santo Tomás, el defensor más grande de la filosofía? Saint Paul and 
Saint Thomas. Was Saint Paul the most severe Critic, or, with Saint Thomas the greatest 
defender of Philosophy? (Madrid: Publicaciones de la Facultad de Teología “San 
Dammaso,” 2009). 
60See, for example, my “Transcendent Holiness as Divine Perfection: Its Importance for 
Understanding Theistic Religions and Interreligious Dialogue” in: Abraham Kovács and 
James L. Cox, New Trends and Recurring Issues in the Study of Religion. (Budapest: 
L´Harmattan, 2014), pp. 203-230. 
61Josef Seifert, “Grundhaltung, Tugend und Handlung als ein Grundproblem der Ethik. 
Würdigung der Entdeckung der sittlichen Grundhaltung durch Dietrich von Hildebrand und 
kritische Untersuchung der Lehre von der ‘Fundamentaloption’ innerhalb der ‘rein 
teleologischen’ Begründung der Ethik,” in: Clemens Breuer (Hg.), Ethik der Tugenden. 
Menschliche Grundhaltungen als unverzichtbarer Bestandteil moralischen Handelns. 
Festschrift für Joachim Piegsa zum 70. Geburtstag, 311-360. 
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I propose a complex motivational structure of the morally good and obligatory 
action. Against Kant, I show the object to be realized decisively motivates moral 
actions, but this must not be identified with Kant, as a eudemonistic or hedonist 
view of ethics. Rather, the good to be protected or realized through our actions 
can motivate us also and principally, because our action is due to its intrinsic 
value. It deserves respect or love for its own sake. 
I also argue, however, that Kant’s intuition of a moral action, which must be 
done “from duty”, points out a moment that motivates a morally obligatory action 
and cannot be reduced to the morally relevant object we realize. Above the object 
whose realization we intend, appears the moment of moral obligation to which we 
owe an absolute obedience that never can be accounted for in terms of an 
adequate response to the object we realize in our action. Moreover, against 
Scheler, I argue that the moral value of our own actions can also be a motive of 
the moral act, that there are, furthermore, different universal objects of the 
morally obligatory action whose missing would destroy the morality of the moral 
act. Finally, moral experience of conscience, as documented by Plato’s Apology of 
Socrates, also gives witness to the fact that, at least implicitly, God as the supreme 
good and as Lord over our moral life, must be responded to for the moral action to 
retain its proper value.
62
 I argue as well that happiness can play a legitimate 
motivating role for moral actions as long as it is not their primary motive but a 
subordinated motive that presupposes a first motive in the intrinsic value of the 
object of the moral act and in other intrinsically important motives of the moral 
action. Ending up with a theory of a six-fold motivation of a morally obligatory 
action that is truly adequate to its object, I propose the unity and fullness of the 
moral action requires the presence and appreciation of each of these motives that, 
in their right order and unison, constitute the morally good action. 
In my book on the foundations of ethics and, more specifically, of medical 
ethics,
63
 I delve more deeply into the essence of moral values and their absolutely 
evidential link to free will. On the question of free will, I have also directed a 
                                                             
62See also Juan-Miguel Palacios, “Cur honeste vivere? Los motivos de la acción moral en 
la ética de Josef Seifert” In: Bondad, moral e inteligencia ética: nueve ensayos de la ética 
de los valores, (Madrid: Encuentro, 2008). 
 
63The Philosophical Diseases of Medicine and Their Cure. Philosophy and Ethics of 
Medicine. Vol. 1: Foundations. (New York: Springer, 2004). 
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two-year research project financed by Fondecyt in Chile. In many articles, and in 
particular in a dialogue with Benjamin Libet and other brain scientists and 
determinists,
64
 I defended the indubitable evidence that we possess a free will and 
described wherein it resides.
65
 
In this book, I treated also a decisive value necessary to understand in order 
to reach the foundation of ethics: human dignity.
66
 I distinguish four dimensions 
of human dignity, which is possibly the most significant new contribution I made 
to the axiological and ontological foundation of ethics: 
(1) The ontological dignity, an intrinsic and sublime value rooted in the being 
and essence of the person as such, not restricted to, but including, the human 
person.  To be a living human being, whether unborn or born, healthy or sick, 
awakened and conscious or unconscious, is enough to possess this dignity. It has 
no degrees and imposes an absolute obligation never to violate it in attitudes or 
actions. It also gives rise to fundamental human rights such as the right not to be 
killed or the right never to be used solely as a means and others that are grounded 
in this ontological dignity. 
(2) The dignity of the person awakened to rational conscious life: Pascal 
                                                             
64For example Benjamin Libet, “Do we Have Free Will?”, in: Robert Kane (Ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Free Will, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 551-564. 
65See articles: “In Defense of Free Will: A Critique of Benjamin Libet,” Review of 
Metaphysics, Volume LXV, Nr. 2, December 2011, pp. 377-407; “Can Neurological 
Evidence Refute Free Will? The Failure of a Phenomenological Analysis of Acts in Libet’s 
Denial of ‘Positive Free Will’,” Pensamiento. Revista de investigación e información 
filosófica, vol. 67, núm. 254, Ciencia, filosofía y religión. Serie especial no 5 (2011), 
1077-1098; “Persons, Causes and Free Will: Libet’s Topsy-Turvy Idea of the Order of 
Causes and ‘Forgetfulness of the Person’,” Journal of East-West Thought, Summer Nr. 2 
Vol. 4, June 2014, pp. 13-51. “Are We Free? Are We Persons? 5 Ways to Obtain Certain 
Knowledge About the Existence of Free Will,” Asian Perspectives in the Arts and 
Humanities. Bi-annual Journal of the School of the Humanities. Ateneo de Manila 
University. Vol. 1, No. 2 2011, pp. 39-79. See also my earlier work, “To Be a Person – To 
Be Free” in: Zofia J. Zdybicka, et al. (Ed.), Freedom in Contemporary Culture. Acts of the 
V World Congress of Christian Philosophy. Catholic University of Lublin 20-25 August 
1996, Vol I (Lublin: The University Press of the Catholic University of Lublin, 1998), pp. 
145-185. 
66The Philosophical Diseases of Medicine and Their Cure, cit., ch. 2. 
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insists on this dignity, making the dangerous claim that our whole dignity consists 
in thought. To recognize the tremendous dignity of the thinking human person is 
very important, as long as one sees also the first source of human (ontological) 
dignity. In the dignity of actually conscious rational persons many rights are 
grounded, which neither the embryo nor any unconscious person possess: the 
right to education, to freedom from coercion, the right to marry, to political 
participation, and countless others. 
(3) While also demons possess the first two dimensions and sources of 
dignity, they fail to possess a third one that requires the good use of human reason 
and free will. This dignity culminates in moral dignity (and holiness) and 
constitutes the vocation of the person. Without ever reaching this third, acquired 
dignity, the first two dimensions of human dignity are of no use to man. Unlike 
the ontological dignity of the person that is the same in all human persons, the 
second and third dignities of persons have countless degrees of perfection. 
(4) There is, fourthly, the “bestowed dignity” as a pure gift that comes from 
some origin outside the person endowed with it, such as the dignity a person 
receives by being loved. This dignity assumes an extreme importance on the 
religious level of human existence: the dignity of being redeemed, of being loved 
by God, of living in a state of grace, exceeds in a certain sense all other 
dimensions of dignity but requires their interrelations and many mutual 
dependencies. 
In The Philosophical Diseases of Medicine and Their Cure, I made two other 
contributions to the foundation of ethics, which I further developed in many 
articles: 
1) First, I showed that an understanding of the moral action as motivated by 
values and goods to be realized (instead by a mere formal, empty Kantian moral 
law that is not based on values and goods) in no way gives rise to a kind of 
utilitarian or pragmatic ethics. It in no way reduces the moral quality of a moral 
action to the result of a calculus that shows that the expected overall 
consequences of a given action exceed in goodness those of all alternative courses 
of action. I showed this by completely refuting the claim that moral actions can be 
considered as mere means to causing certain goods. Such “teleological” or 
consequentialist ethics totally overlook the specific moral values born from the 
encounter of a conscious and free person with these goods or evils that demand an 
adequate response to them. In this moral value lies a far higher value than values 
realized in extra-moral effects and consequences of moral actions. Moreover, the 
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incommensurability of this value with non-moral values and consequences of 
human actions implies also that there are intrinsically wrong actions, even actions 
that have finite goods as their object. These actions must never be done, whatever 
their good consequences may be.
67
  
2) Another major error to refute is that content-full ethics (“non-formal value 
ethics”)68 cannot be philosophically or rationally founded, but can have solely 
religious foundations. This radically fideist position, proposed by T. H. 
Engelhardt, Jr., negates to human reason any capacity to grasp a “natural law” and 
divorces entirely a content-full purely religious ethics of “private strangers in a 
public and pluralistic universe” from a philosophical ethics, a position I sharply 
criticized.
69
 It proposes the idea; going far beyond the formalism of Kantian 
ethics, that human reason cannot establish any human action to be intrinsically 
wrong. While Kant in his personalist formulation of the categorical imperative 
(that was adopted by Polish ethical personalism as fundamental principle of 
ethics) still holds to the absolute value of personal dignity in the foundation of 
ethics, Engelhardt proposes a purely formalistic content-less philosophical ethics 
                                                             
67See The Philosophical Diseases of Medicine and Their Cure, cit., ch. 6. See also my 
“Absolute Moral Obligations towards Finite Goods as Foundation of Intrinsically Right 
and Wrong Actions. A Critique of Consequentialist Teleological Ethics: Destruction of 
Ethics through Moral Theology?” Anthropos 1 (1985), pp. 57-94. “Der Glanz der sittlichen 
Wahrheit als Fundament in sich schlechter Handlungen. Die Enzyklika “Veritatis 
Splendor” von Johannes Paul II,” in: Clemens Breuer (Hg.), Ethik der Tugenden. 
Menschliche Grundhaltungen als unverzichtbarer Bestandteil moralischen Handelns. 
Festschrift für Joachim Piegsa zum 70. Geburtstag, (Eos, 2000)  pp. 465-487; “The 
Splendor of Truth and Intrinsically Immoral Acts I: A Philosophical Defense of the 
Rejection of Proportionalism and Consequentialism in Veritatis Splendor”. Studia 
Philosophiae Christianae UKSW 52 (2015) 2, pp. 27-67; “The Splendor of Truth and 
Intrinsically Immoral Acts II: A Philosophical Defense of the Rejection of Proportionalism 
and Consequentialism in Veritatis New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 
2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1996). Splendor. Studia Philosophiae Christianae UKSW 
51 (2015) 2, pp. 7-37. 
68See Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt 
Towards the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, transl. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. 
Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1973). 
69Josef Seifert, The Philosophical Diseases of Medicine and Their Cure, cit., ch. 5. 
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that allows to secular bioethics in a pluralist society any moral horror. Pushing for 
an extreme liberalism and formalism in secular ethics, he calls in his Christian 
Bioethics the same acts that his secular ethics allows, for example abortion, 
euthanasia, assisted suicide, etc. deadly sins that deserve hell.
70
 The United States 
Constitution, which Engelhardt interprets as abstaining from any natural law 
position, can serve as an extremely successful model for such a modern pluralistic 
society in which private moral codes of certain groups in society are not imposed 
on anyone else. According to it, if it is more and more applied, the standards of a 
public morality derive only from limited consensus, but more so from agreement, 
permission, and toleration. Therefore, they can be kept so liberal that, as far as 
humanly tolerable, within them anything is legally and ethically permitted. Any 
members or groups within this pluralistic society might choose to adopt this as 
their life-style. Engelhardt proposes “a public ethics for moral strangers” (that is, 
for individuals who do not participate in ‘a common moral vision’) when they 
meet on the marketplace and in the public cultural space of a pluralistic, 
non-coercive society.
71
 He himself holds a ‘private ethics’ which he accepts for 
the sphere of his own personal life and which condemns, for example, abortion 
and infanticide which his public ethics permits, as horrible crimes. This position 
leads him to an almost schizophrenic opposition between his private ethics and 
the public secular ethics and laws he proposes.
72
 
One could hardly go farther in the separation between reason and faith. 
Fides et Ratio - Philosophy of Religion. The critique of such a destruction of 
philosophical “secular” ethics is closely linked to another area of my 
philosophical investigation into the philosophy of religion. As a Catholic 
                                                             
70T. H. Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Christian Bioethics, (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger, 
2000); The Foundation of Bioethics, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1996). 
71The Foundations of Bioethics, 1986. 
72 He propounds this ethics in several articles in the journal Christian Bioethics. 
Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality. As a matter of fact, Engelhard  states in the 
preface to the 2nd edition of his The Foundations of Bioethics, p. x, that the eternal fires of 
hell expect those who carry out what he proposes for ‘public ethics’, such as abortion on 
demand: “I am of the firm conviction that, save of God’s mercy, those who willfully engage 
in much that a peaceable, fully secular state will permit (e.g., euthanasia and direct abortion 
on demand) stand in danger of hell’s eternal fires. 
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philosopher, I have dedicated many investigations to the topic of the relations 
between reason and faith. I rejected five very different and widespread 
interpretations of these relations between reason and faith, and five corresponding 
notions of “Christian philosophy”. One of them is a completely fideist and 
skeptical one of the sort Engelhardt proposes, so as if human reason could know 
truth solely by means of religious faith. Another one, represented by Hegel and 
many Gnostics throughout the centuries, is its opposite, as if philosophy could 
rationally prove, usually by entirely reinterpreting them, the mysteries of 
Christian faith.  
I identify eleven positive relations between philosophy and faith, which 
justify the misleading term “Christian philosophy”.73 My basic understanding of 
their relation is that many ethical and other truths our faith teaches us, are also 
known by rational philosophical evidence which per se does not depend on faith, 
but in a certain way is even objectively presupposed by faith: Gratia supponit 
naturam (grace presupposes nature). Thus, I think that the relation between 
philosophy and faith is only valuable, if both are distinguished and neither reason 
rationalizes and falsifies revealed truth, denying or transforming it into an entirely 
different system such as Hegel’s “Christian philosophy” and other forms of 
rationalistic dissolution of mysteries of faith, nor reason loses its purity and 
autonomy. My new book, Filosofía cristiana y purísima razón (Granada: Nuevo 
Inicio, submitted 2016, to be published by 2018) expresses this most clearly. I 
propose that the purest, most rational philosophical knowledge can profit from 
faith and is needed to understand and defend faith. For example, the truths about 
birth control, the dignity and sanctity of human life, and the intrinsic and grave 
moral wrongness of any form of abortion and euthanasia, expressed in Humanae 
Vitae, Veritatis Splendor and Evangelium Vitae, are fully open to pure 
philosophical knowledge. The relation between reason and faith can of course 
prompt the Church to condemn philosophical errors that are opposite to faith. 
Likewise, their complex mutual relationships entail, in virtue of the autonomy of 
human reason, elements of a critique of religion, with which the relation between 
reason and faith began in Xenophanes, Plato, and others. As a believing Christian, 
the philosopher has no doubt the task of criticizing the countless errors and 
                                                             
73See my “Filosofia cristiana e libertà. A cura di Gian Paolo Terravecchia." (Brescia: 
Morcelliana, 2013); Christian Philosophy and Free Will. (South Bend, Indiana: St. 
Augustine Press, 2016). 
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confusions Christian philosophers and theologians have defended. Practically 
each Christian heresy has its roots in philosophical errors. Even as a believing 
Catholic who believes in the gift of infallibility given to the Church as a whole 
and to the Pope when he pronounces dogmas of faith, I believe that philosophical 
knowledge retains the task to criticize beliefs of Catholic theologians, and even 
utterances of the ordinary magisterium of the Church. When Popes are not 
infallibly pronouncing a dogmatic teaching, which they most rarely did, they can 
clearly contradict rationally known or also revealed truths, even committing 
heresies such as Pope Liberius or John XXII.
74
 
                                                             
74See, for example, my “Der sittliche Unterschied zwischen Empfängnisregelung und 
Kontrazeption” in Menschenwürde und Elternschaft (Hg. Ernst Wenisch), (Valendar: 
Veritas-Verlag, 1983); “The Problem of the Moral Significance of Human Fertility and 
Birth Control Methods. Philosophical Arguments against Contraception?” in Humanae 
Vitae: 20 Anni Dopo, Acts of the Second International Congress of Moral Theology, Rome, 
1988,, pp. 661-672; “Il Dono dell’ Amore e Il Dono di Una Nuova Vita. Verso una visione 
più personalistica dell’ Matrimonio. Humanae Vitae - Familiaris Consortio. 1968-1988”  
in: Per una transmissione responsabile della vita umana, a cura di Anna Cappella. IVo 
Congresso internazionale per la famiglia d’Africa e d’Europa (Rom: Università dell’ Sacro 
Cuore, 1989); “Problem moralnego zcaczenia ludzkiej plodnosci i metod kontroli pocze’c,” 
transl. J. Merecki SDS and P. Mikulska, in: Bp K. Majda’nski/T.Styczeî, Dar ludzkiego 
Zycia Humanae Vitae Donum. W swudziesta rocznice ogloszenia encykliki Humanae Vitae 
(Lublin: KUL-Verlag, 1991), 247-259; “Una reflexion filosófica y una defensa de Humanae 
Vitae. El don del amor y de la nueva vida” in: Benedicto XVI, Karol Wojtyìa, Carlo 
Cafarra, Antonio Me Rouco Varela, Angelo Scola, Livio Melina, Alfonso López Trujillo, 
Fernando Chomali, Josef Seifert, A cuarenta años de la Encíclica Humanae Vitae, 
Cuaderno Humanitas No 19, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Octubre 2008, pp. 
49-59; “El aborto ‚terapéutico‘ a la luz de la encíclica Evangelium Vitae,” Humanitas, 
Cuaderno No 24, Marzo 2011, pp. 112-122. “Der Glanz der sittlichen Wahrheit als 
Fundament in sich schlechter Handlungen. Die Enzyklika “Veritatis Splendor” von Johannes 
Paul II” in: Clemens Breuer (Hg.), Ethik der Tugenden. Menschliche Grundhaltungen als 
unverzichtbarer Bestandteil moralischen Handelns. (Eos, 2000) pp. 465-487; “The Splendor 
of Truth and Intrinsically Immoral Acts I: A Philosophical Defense of the Rejection of 
Proportionalism and Consequentialism in Veritatis Splendor.” Studia Philosophiae 
Christianae UKSW 52 (2015) 2, pp. 27-67; “The Splendor of Truth and Intrinsically 
Immoral Acts II: A Philosophical Defense of the Rejection of Proportionalism and 
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Consequentialism in Veritatis Splendor”. Studia Philosophiae Christianae UKSW 51 (2015) 
2, pp. 7-37. I have also criticized assertions made by Popes John Paul II, Benedict XVI, 
and Francis, on brain death, ethics, and other issues. For outside the sphere of what I take 
as infallible Papal teachings, there are errors possible. With respect to them, also 
philosophy retains its critical function in relation to religion, which is not restricted to the 
erroneous Greek religion which Xenophanes and Plato already have sharply criticized. It 
also refers to what I accept as true religion, but this does not exclude that private publications, 
or even the ordinary but not infallible magisterium of Popes, can contain errors which 
philosophers have the task to examine critically. In other words, even the most orthodox 
Catholic who adheres to any dogma of the faith, should avoid any kind of false respect for 
utterances of bishops or even Popes when they clearly contradict philosophically knowable 
truth. In many publications and letters written during decades, which I will not list here, I 
exerted, as I believe, this critical function of philosophy as a watchdog of human reason that 
Church and Pope need very much and for which some Popes thanked me. 
 
